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The Energy Wealth of Indian Nations
Shawn E. Regan∗
Terry L. Anderson∗∗
INTRODUCTION
Economists have long sought to explain why some nations are
rich while others are poor.1 Although the recipe for growth remains
a matter of debate, most agree that secure property rights and a
stable rule of law are necessary ingredients for economic growth.2
Property rights provide incentives to generate wealth, encourage
resource stewardship, and form the basis for market exchanges. A
stable rule of law promotes long-term investment by reducing the
cost of engaging in market exchange and encouraging capital
accumulation.
The importance of the institutions of property rights and the
rule of law is evident in American Indian reservations.3 Crossing
into reservations, especially in the western United States, reveals
islands of poverty in a sea of wealth. Per capita income for
American Indians living on reservations is about half that of other
United States citizens.4 Thirty-nine percent of Indians live in
poverty, compared with nine percent of white Americans, and
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1. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Roy Harold Campbell & Andrew S. Skinner eds.,
1976) (1776); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).
2. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 1.
3. See Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Sovereignty, Credible
Commitments, and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations, 51 J.
LAW & ECON. 641, 646 (2008).
4. See 2006-2010 American Community Survey Selected Population
Tables, AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf
/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, archived at http://perma.cc/9C7C-QZ9R.
See also HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 114-16 (2008) [hereinafter HARVARD PROJECT].
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Indian unemployment is almost four times higher than the United
States average.5
This Article discusses the effects of the institutions and
regulations that restrict energy development on tribal lands. It
posits that economic development could be realized in Indian
Country if tribes and individual Indians had more secure property
rights and greater ability to control their own natural resources.
The Article then proceeds by providing a background of
reservation land tenure and the institutions governing tribal energy
development. Next, the Article describes existing energy
development on Indian reservations and examines the untapped
energy potential on Indian lands. The discussion section of this
Article suggests that the institutions governing Indian lands, along
with the additional regulations that apply to tribal energy
development, act to suppress energy-related economic growth on
Indian lands by limiting opportunities for tribes to capitalize on
their energy resources. This Article concludes by suggesting that in
order to develop their natural resources, tribes living on Indian
reservations must be granted the same rights and institutions as
those living elsewhere.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE OBSTACLES IN THE
PATH
A. Land of Plenty: Abundance of Energy Resources on American
Indian Property
Low incomes exist on Indian reservations despite the fact that
many reservations contain considerable natural resources,
particularly energy resources.6 Reservations contain almost 30% of
the nation’s coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50% of potential
uranium reserves, and 20% of known oil and gas reserves.7 The
Department of the Interior (DOI) estimates that 15 million acres of
potential energy and mineral resources are undeveloped on Indian
lands while only 2.1 million acres of Indian land are being tapped
for their energy resources.8 According to one study, the Crow
5. HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 4, at 114. See also Maura Grogan,
Native American Lands and Natural Resource Development, REVENUE WATCH
INST. 6 (2011), http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI
_Native_American_Lands_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7C62-MJD5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3–7.
8. Indian Energy Development: Hearing before the Comm. on Indian
Affairs, United States Senate, 110th Cong. 42 (2008) [hereinafter IED Hearing]
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Reservation in Montana contains coal and other assets valued at
nearly $27 billion, approximately $3.3 million per tribal member,
making the tribe one of the largest coal owners in the world.9
Despite such energy wealth, the tribe’s annual rate of return on
coal assets is a mere 0.01%.10 The tribe has reported
unemployment rates as high as 78%.11 Similarly, the Fort Berthold
reservation in North Dakota sits atop one of the nation’s largest oil
and gas plays, but the development of resources on the reservation
is slower than off the reservation.12 Simply put, energy resources
on Indian lands are substantial. The potential wealth that could be
derived from such resources presents an opportunity for significant
economic growth for both American Indians and the United States
economy.13
B. Economic Growth in American Indian Communities
Given this natural resource wealth, why do Indian reservations
remain poor? This Article posits that the answer has to do with the
structure of the economic and legal institutions on reservations.14
Abundant natural resources are neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for economic growth. What matters for economic
growth, both in general and on reservations, are institutions that
determine whether human capital, physical capital, and natural

(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and
Economic Development).
9. Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Where’s the Glue? Institutional and
Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SOCIOECONOMICS 443, 444 (2000).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Sierra Crane-Murdoch, The Other Bakken Boom: A Tribe Atop the
Nation’s Biggest Oil Play, PERC Case Study (Nov. 28, 2012), http://perc.org
/articles/other-bakken-boom, archived at http://perma.cc/J43-9TAD.
13. Opportunities to develop renewable energy resources also exist on
Indian reservations. See, e.g., Resources, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/indian
energy/resources, archived at http://perma.cc/YHR2-HZ3Y (last visited Oct. 7,
2014) (citing National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the
Department of the Interior) (estimating that, in addition to conventional fossil
fuel energy resources, Indian lands have the potential to produce 14 billion
megawatt-hours (MWh) rural utility-scale solar resources, 1.1 billion MWh
wind resources, 7 million MWh hydropower resources, 5 million MWh
geothermal (hydrothermal) resources, and 4 million MWh biomass (solids)
resources).
14. We use the term “institutions” following Douglass C. North,
Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991) (“Institutions are the humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”).
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resources are used efficiently.15 In their search for the factors that
promote economic growth on reservations, authors Cornell and
Kalt explained that “a tribe’s resources can be wasted or go
untapped unless that tribe can establish an incentive environment
that channels them into productive ends.”16 Similarly, authors
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson concluded that “countries with
better ‘institutions,’ more secure property rights, and less
distortionary policies will invest more in physical and human
capital, and will use these factors more efficiently to achieve a
greater level of income.”17
The complex history of the federal government’s relationship
with American Indians has largely denied tribes the institutional
attributes that promote widespread economic growth.18
Crossing a reservation boundary often means entering an entirely
different set of legal institutions, including property rights and the
rule of law. Outside reservations, local, county, state, and federal
governments provide relatively stable property rights through law
enforcement and judicial institutions conducive to economic
growth.19 Inside reservations, however, legal jurisdictions and land
tenure can vary widely, resulting in a complicated mosaic of
property ownership. This mosaic consists of lands held in trust by
the United States government on behalf of tribes, lands held in
trust by the federal government on behalf of individual Indians,
and fee-simple lands located within reservation boundaries.20
15. Id. See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9, at 467 (“Generous resource
endowments, human capital, and access to financial capital will be virtually
useless if tribes . . . lack the institutional structures necessary to maintain a
hospitable environment for human and financial investment.”). See also Ian
Keay & Cherie Metcalf, Property Rights, Resource Access, and Long-Run
Growth, 8 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 792, 829 (2011) (examining the effect
of secure aboriginal property rights to natural resources on long-run
macroeconomic growth in Canada).
16. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9, at 446.
17. Daron Acemoglu, et. al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1369
(2001) (emphasis in original).
18. See Anderson & Parker, supra note 3, at 641. The history of the federal
government trusteeship of Indian lands is discussed in greater detail later in the
article.
19. Id.
20. The various forms of land tenure found on reservations are discussed
infra. See Marsha A. Goetting & Kristin Ruppel, Planning for the Passing of
Reservation Lands to Future Generatons: How Reservation Land is Owned by
Individuals, AIRPRA FACTSHEET 3 (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.indiancountry
extension.org/sites/indiancountryextension.org/files/publications/files/u6/AIPR
A%20factsheet3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YCU8-NLET (providing a
detailed description of how reservation land is owned by individuals).
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Navigating this complex system of land ownership makes both
energy development and economic growth difficult on many
reservations.21 In addition, the federal government’s trust authority
over Indian lands has often prevented tribes from fully capitalizing
on their natural resource wealth. Authors Anderson and Lueck, for
example, found that agricultural productivity on Indian lands held
in trust by the federal government was significantly less than on
similar fee-simple lands on reservations.22
Regarding energy resources, at least four federal agencies are
involved in the execution of any energy lease on tribal lands.23
Until the 1970s, tribes could not negotiate the terms for energy
leases on their lands, and to this day, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) remains responsible for approving and overseeing energy
development on Indian trust land.24 Not only does the BIA’s trust
authority raise the cost of energy development on Indian lands, but
it also has a long history of not living up to its fiduciary
responsibility of managing Indian trust funds, as evidenced by the
1996 class-action suit Cobell v. Salazar. In Cobell, petitioners
alleged that the United States government incorrectly accounted
for income from trust assets belonging to Indian landowners. 25 The
case settled in 2009 with the federal government agreeing to pay
individual Indians and tribes $3.4 billion.26
To make matters worse, tribes often have difficulty attracting
investment for energy development on reservations if they misuse
their sovereign powers to tax or employ eminent domain. 27 Tribal
21. See Shawn Regan, Unlocking the Energy Wealth of Indian Nations:
Overcoming Obstacles to Tribal Energy Development, 1 PERC POLICY
PERSPECTIVE 7–8, 10 (2014), http://perc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/IndianPolicy
Series%20HIGH.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VY57-MXH3.
22. Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural
Productivity on Indian Reservations, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 427–54 (1992).
23. Grogan, supra note 5, at 18–22. The four agencies involved with
decision-making, revenue flows, and oversight of energy development on Indian
lands include at least the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (formerly the Minerals
Management Service), and Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians.
A fifth federal agency, the Office of Surface Mining, is involved when coal
resources are extracted on Indian lands.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
26. Patrick Reis, Obama Admin Strikes $3.4B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/08/08green
wire-obama-admin-strikes-34b-deal-in-indian-trust-l-92369.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/VJ6P-R9SP.
27. See David D. Haddock, Foreseeing Confiscation by the Sovereign:
Lessons from the American West, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1994). See also David
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sovereignty can be an asset when it places control over energy
development in the hands of tribal members because it ensures that
the tribe has a larger stake in the outcome. However, tribal
sovereignty can also be a liability if it makes the rule of law on
reservations less certain.28 Tribal governments, like all sovereign
nations, face the dilemma of whether to promote institutions that
create a climate for investment based on the rule of law or to
pursue policies with short-term benefits by taking profits and
property rights from investors.
Several court cases involving takings of property by tribes have
caused investment concerns throughout Indian Country.29 If
investors believe tribal governments could abuse their sovereign
powers to take a larger share of profits from economic
development projects, such abuse can stifle private investment on
reservations.30 These reputational effects may extend to tribal

D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Sovereignty Can be a Liability: How Tribes Can
Mitigate the Sovereign’s Paradox, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 194–213 (Terry L. Anderson, et al. eds., 2006).
28. Id.
29. The Jicarilla Apache tribe in Arizona, for example, faced this dilemma
when it began negotiating with petroleum companies to explore and produce oil
and gas on its reservation. The contracts provided for royalty payments to the
tribe of 12.5%. In 1976, after the companies had made significant investments in
infrastructure, the tribe added a severance tax, taking the total rate to nearly
20%. The companies took the tribe to court, contending that only state and local
authorities had the ability to tax mineral rights on Indian reservations. The
companies eventually lost the argument when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
the tribe’s sovereign power to tax. See generally Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
30. The Hualapai tribe recently became embroiled in a dispute after
contracting with a developer to invest nearly $30 million to build a tourist
attraction known as the “Skywalk.” The clear, horseshoe-shaped glass walkway,
jutting 70 feet out from the rim of the Grand Canyon, opened in 2007 and by
2013 had attracted 1.4 million visitors with the potential to generate an
estimated $100 million over the next two decades. Arguing that the developer
did not deliver on his end of the bargain, the tribe used its eminent domain
power to take the property without compensation. The developer took the tribe
to federal court where in 2013, U.S. District Judge David Campbell ruled in
favor of the developer saying that the tribe had “clearly waived its sovereign
immunity” and that its legal arguments were “odd,” “nonsensical,” and “wholly
unconvincing.” Louise Benson, chairwoman of the tribe when the Skywalk
contract was signed, said current tribal leaders are “giving the Hualapai a
terrible reputation that will injure the tribe for years.” See Dennis Wagner,
Grand Canyon Skywalk Judgment Could Devastate Tribe, USA TODAY, (Feb.
19, 2013, 8:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/19
/grand-canyon-skywalk-judgment-tribe/1929813/, archived at http://perma.cc
/J7PV-7HCN.
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efforts to develop energy resources, which often require significant
amounts of private investment from outside the reservation.
II. RESERVATION LAND TENURE AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Understanding the evolution of reservation land tenure is
important for understanding resource extraction on Indian lands. A
brief history of American Indian land ownership and its impact on
resource extraction helps explain the complicated relationship that
exists between tribes and the federal government.
A. The Evolution of the Federal Trust Doctrine
The doctrine of federal trust responsibility that defines the
relationship between the federal government and tribes traces its
roots to Supreme Court decisions in the early 1800s.31 Chief
Justice Marshall described tribes as “domestic dependent nations,”
unable to negotiate treaties with foreign nations, but implying that
they retained the power to govern themselves.32 Marshall went on
to state that Indians “are in a state of pupilage” and characterized
their relationship with the United States as resembling “that of a
ward to his guardian.”33 From this conception, the federal
government became the trustee for Indian lands. This trust
relationship between Indians and the federal government, which
continues today, extends to surface and subsurface resources.34
Therefore, although tribal sovereignty implied the right for Indians
to govern themselves, it did not grant tribes complete autonomy to
devise their own property rights and governance structures.35 Two
31. The following three cases, often referred to as the Marshall Trilogy,
established the doctrine of federal trust responsibility: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (finding that Indians have rights to occupy
lands but do not have rights to own land); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1 (1831) (denying the Cherokee Nation’s claim that they were a foreign nation);
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (finding that the Cherokee
Nation was a distinct community within which the laws of the State of Georgia
could have no force).
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17
33. Id.
34. See generally Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian
Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.
J. 541, 545 (1993) (noting that “the surface and subsurface estates of Indian
country may be unified in one owner or split, but the permutations are
complex”).
35. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and
the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (2008); STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT,
T WO A PPROACHES TO E CONOMIC D EVELOPMENT ON A MERICAN I NDIAN
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centuries later, the trust doctrine requires any energy development
taking place on tribal lands to be authorized by the federal
government.36
The government’s characterization of Indians as “wards” was
codified with the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as
the Dawes Act.37 Under the Act, many Indian lands were allotted
to individual Indians, but the lands were held in trust until the
Secretary of the Interior deemed the allottee “competent and
capable of managing his or her own affairs.”38 Other lands were
considered surplus land and opened to homesteading by nonIndians.39 Once Indian allottees were declared competent, their
allotments were removed from federal trust restrictions and feesimple title was granted.40 These titles gave owners the right to
manage their land as they saw fit, including the right to sell the
land.
The allotment era ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).41 The Act virtually froze the remaining
Indian lands in trust status for which fee-simple title had not been
granted prior to 1934.42 Lands released from trusteeship prior to
reorganization remain in fee-simple title, giving owners autonomy
over land-use decisions within the limits of the law.43 Released
lands can be sold, encumbered as collateral for loans, or leased for

R ESERVATIONS : O NE W ORKS , THE O THER D OESN ’ T (2006), available at
http://nni.arizona.edu/resources/inpp/2005-02_jopna__Two_Approaches.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/C4RQ-H8TX; Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt,
Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on
American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992) (distinguishing between “political
sovereignty” and “practical sovereignty”).
36. See Royster, supra note 34, at 1074–81.
37. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000).
38. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General Allotment
Act) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349). In 1917, allottees with less than one-half
Indian blood were considered competent and were issued fee-simple titles to
their lands, thereby removing the federal trust restrictions and allowing the
allottee to sell the land. In 1920, however, this policy of automatically deeming
allottees competent based on blood quantum was abolished. See Judith V.
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 11 (1995).
39. See Royster, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-495).
42. Grogan, supra note 5, at 11.
43. See Goetting & Ruppel, supra note 20 (describing how reservation land
is owned).
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energy development without the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.44 In contrast, individual trust lands and tribal trust lands
are subject to BIA control.45 The BIA can grant or deny permission
to lease or develop tribal resources.46 Individual and tribal trust
lands cannot be sold and generally cannot be encumbered as
collateral in the capital market.47 To compound the complexity,
individual trust lands have often been passed in undivided interest
to Indian heirs.48 After several generations, ownership can become
so fractionated that hundreds of heirs exist, all of whom must agree
on how land is used.49
B. The Impact of Trusteeship on Energy Development
The combination of the Dawes Act, the IRA, and sales to nonIndian owners has left a complicated mosaic of land tenure on
reservations including fee-simple, individual trust (also known as
allotted), and tribal trust lands. This mosaic extends to the
subsurface as well, where ownership of mineral rights occasionally
differs from ownership of the surface.50 Across Indian Country,
44. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 11–12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 11.
48. See Jake Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Creeping Normalcy: Fractionation
of Indian Land Ownership (George Mason Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper
No. 13-28, 2013).
49. Id. The problem of fractionated Indian ownership increases
exponentially with each passing generation, meaning the problem only gets
worse as time passes. The federal recordkeeping costs also increase as
fractionation continues. In 1992, the GAO estimated the BIA’s annual
recordkeeping costs for twelve reservations with fractionated ownership were
between $40 and $50 million. By 2010, these costs had increased to $246
million per year due to increased fractionation. See Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 685–87 (1998) (on the problem of the anticommons).
Today, there are 156, 596 individual Indian land allotments and more than 4.7
million fractionated interests. See also Report of the Commission on Indian Trust
Administration and Reform, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Dec. 10, 2013), http:
//www.doi.gov/cobell/commission/upload/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Indian
-Trust-Administration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8R9S-UMQ6.
50. For example, see CROW INDIAN RESERVATION, NATURAL, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT AND CONDITIONS REPORT
(2002), available at http://www.blm.gov/mt/st/en/fo/miles_city_field_office/og
_eis/crow.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3D39-B42B. This report was
intended for use with the Montana Statewide Revised Draft/Final Oil and Gas
Environmental Impact Statement and Amendments of the Powder River and
Billings Resource Management Plan (Jan. 2002). For further discussion, see
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75% of surface rights are tribal trust land, 20 percent are individual
trust land, and 5% are fee-simple land.51
Other federal statutes further complicate energy development
on Indian trust lands. Under legislation passed in 1891, trust lands
can be leased for grazing or mineral development.52 Initially,
leasing required tribal consent for resource extraction, but
Congress removed the consent requirement in 1919 for certain
mineral leases in the West.53 Subsequently, energy development
occurred on reservations through a leasing process controlled
almost entirely by the federal government.54 The Indian Mineral
Leasing Act (IMLA) of 1938 attempted to revitalize tribal
governments by restoring some tribal control over energy
development decisions.55 The Act established a standardized
mineral leasing system and set minimum rates for rents and
royalties.56 In practice, however, tribal control was limited. The
IMLA granted tribes “the key right to consent before leasing could
occur,” but allowed them “no say in the mining process once they
authorized the leasing of their lands, and no right to certain
cancellation” for breach of contract.57 Lease terms, including
royalty amounts and other payments, were decided on and
enforced by the BIA and the United States Geological Survey
(USGS).58 Both agencies have consistently undervalued Indian

Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, The Wealth of Indian Nations:
Economic Performance and Institutions on Reservations, in SELF
DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 159–193 (Terry L.
Anderson et al. eds., 2006).
51. See Terry Anderson & Dominic Parker, Un-American Reservations,
DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER INSTITUTION JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2011), http:
//www.hoover.org/research/un-american-reservations, archived at http://perma
.cc/77BP-EAAE.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (2012).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 399. See Royster, supra note 34, at 1072. Tribal consent
was not required in the act of 1919, but several statutes in 1924 and 1927 did
require consent. 25 U.S.C. § 398–398a.
54. Grogan, supra note 5, at 13; MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON
BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 14 (1990). During the
early era of energy development on Indian lands “the federal government was
entirely in charge—of what resources could be developed, for what length of
time, and under what circumstances.” See Royster, supra note 34, at 1072.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 396a2–396g.
56. Royster, supra note 35, at 1073–74.
57. Royster, supra note 34, at 565.
58. Id.

2014]

THE ENERGY WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS

205

resources and, by all accounts, done a poor job of negotiating lease
terms and collecting royalties on behalf of tribes.59
During the 1970s and 1980s, tribes were afforded a more active
role in energy development decisions on reservations. In 1982, for
instance, the Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) was
enacted, which eventually allowed tribes (but not individual
allottees) to enter into any type of energy extraction agreement
they desired.60 The Act also allowed lease terms and royalty
amounts to be determined by tribes rather than the federal
agencies.61 The IMDA represented a positive step towards tribal
self-determination. Under the Act, tribes can negotiate leases, joint
ventures, production sharing, or other agreements to develop
resources.62
C. Limitations on Tribal Autonomy in Energy Development
Today, IMDA agreements are the primary means by which
tribes lease lands for energy development.63 Nonetheless, the
federal trusteeship of Indian lands limits opportunities for tribal
resource development and self-determination. The BIA and other
federal agencies are required to oversee and approve all
development agreements on Indian lands, adding layers of
regulations and bureaucracy to tribal resource development
projects.64 Tribes must acquire approval from the Secretary of the
Interior for each specific lease or agreement, a process that is
notoriously slow and cumbersome.65
In 2005, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act to further promote tribal

59. The American Indian Policy Review Commission concluded in 1977
that “the leases negotiated on behalf of Indians are among the poorest
agreements ever made.” AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 95TH CONG.,
92–185, FINAL REP. 339 (1977). The federal government incorrectly accounted
for income from trust assets belonging to Indian landowners, as examined in
Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
60. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012). Final regulations to implement the
IMDA were not promulgated until much later. The IMDA finally became
effective in 1994. See Royster, supra note 34, at 584 n.281.
61. Royster, supra note 34, at 585–88.
62. Id.
63. Grogan, supra note 5, at 15.
64. Id.
65. See Royster, supra note 35, at 1077 n.69 (noting that an IMDA
agreement on Fort Berthold took “over three years,” and citing testimony from a
Crow member noting “an extremely slow BIA approval process”).
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self-determination.66 The Act authorizes tribes to create Tribal
Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs) that would afford tribes
much greater control over energy development decisions. Once a
TERA is approved, tribes would no longer need to receive separate
approval for each business arrangement the tribes make in order to
undertake resource development.67 Thus far, no tribe has entered
into a TERA because, as one observer notes, “the rules and
regulations around implementing a TERA are exceedingly
complex.”68
III. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
A. Available Energy Resources
American Indian reservations make up nearly 56 million acres,
or about 2.3% of the total United States land base.69 The DOI
estimates energy exploration and development has taken place on
2.1 million acres in Indian Country, while another 15 million acres
with energy and mineral resources are undeveloped.70 In other
words, 88% of Indian lands with energy or mineral potential
remain untapped. Of course, energy resources are not evenly
distributed among Indian lands. Reservations in the western United
States contain most of the energy wealth of Indian nations.71
Energy tribes, as they are often called, “receive a significant
portion of their income from energy minerals or . . . own
substantial undeveloped reserves.”72

66. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506 (2012). Final federal regulations took effect on
April 9, 2008. See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 25 C.F.R. 224 (2014).
67. These business arrangements include “[a]ny permit, contract, joint
venture, option, or other agreement that furthers any activity related to locating,
producing, transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land.” 25
C.F.R. § 224.30 (2014).
68. Grogan, supra note 5, at 16.
69. The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing 56 million
surface acres and 57 million acres of subsurface mineral estates. See Report of
the Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform, supra note 49, at
16.
70. IED Hearing, supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Dr. Robert W.
Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development,
Office of the Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the
Interior).
71. Grogan, supra note 5, at 29.
72. AMBLER, supra note 54, at 3.
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TABLE 1 SELECT MAJOR ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES73
State

Tribe

Resources

NM

Hopi
Navajo
Southern Ute
Ute Mountain
Blackfeet
Crow
Assiniboine and Sioux (Fort Peck)
Northern Cheyenne
Jicarilla Apache

C, O, G
C, O, G, U
C, O, G
C, O, G, U
C, O, G
C, O, G
C, O, G
C, O
C, O, G

ND

Three Affiliated (Fort Berthold)

C, O, G

OK

Osage

O, G

AZ
CO

MT

UT

Uintah and Ouray Ute
C, O, G, OS
and Shoshone (Wind
WY Arapahoe
C, O, G, U
River)
C – Coal, O – Oil, G – Gas, OS – Oil Shale, U – Uranium
Technological advancements in energy extraction add to the
potential energy wealth of Indian nations. Extensive shale oil and
gas reserves that lay beneath many reservations are now accessible
with improvements in the hydraulic fracturing process. For
instance, the Fort Berthold reservation sits above the Bakken oil
field in North Dakota where in 2013 the USGS estimated there are
7.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 6.7 trillion cubic feet of
technically recoverable natural gas.74 These estimates represent a

73. Grogan, supra note 5, at 29.
74. STEPHANIE B. GASWIRTH ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL
RESOURCES IN THE BAKKEN AND THREE FORKS FORMATIONS, WILLISTON BASIN
PROVINCE, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA, 2013 (2013)
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3013/fs2013-3013.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/R6BV-XTDX (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
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doubling and tripling, respectively, of previous government
estimates.75
B. Challenges to Tapping into Available Resources
Several factors create challenges for the development of tribal
energy resources. First, as explained above, federal trusteeship of
Indian lands and other laws make it difficult for individual Indians
or tribes to capitalize on their energy resources.76 Second, the
uncertain structure of tribal legal institutions increases the cost and
risk of doing business on reservations, making it difficult for tribes
to attract outside investors.77 Finally, federal laws put decisions
regarding land use and energy development in the hands of
agencies that have a less than stellar record for managing resources
in a way that maximizes the welfare of Indians.78
The economic costs of these factors are felt particularly by the
Three Affiliated Tribes on the Fort Berthold reservation. Although
the tribes are located at the center of the boom in United States
shale oil and gas development, Fort Berthold is largely missing out
on the economic growth experienced beyond its borders.79 On
Indian lands, companies must go through four federal agencies and
forty-nine regulatory or administrative steps to acquire a permit to
drill, compared with only four steps when drilling off reservation.80
The effect of these additional constraints on Indian lands is to raise
the cost to energy companies of entering into resource
development agreements with tribes or tribal members.81 When
development does occur, it often generates a lower return for the
tribes and individual Indians due to additional bureaucratic and
regulatory obstacles.82 Lease payments to mineral owners are often
higher off the reservation lands, leading many tribal members on
Fort Berthold to question why they are not able to take full
advantage of the energy boom occurring around them.83

75. Id. In addition to coal, oil, and natural gas, tribes also have significant
sources of oil shale, uranium, copper, and rare earth minerals. The focus of this
article, however, is on coal, oil, and natural gas.
76. For a discussion of the obstacles to Indian energy development, see
Regan, supra note 21.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 11–13.
79. Crane-Murdoch, supra note 12.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 18–28.
83. Crane-Murdoch, supra note 12, at 3.

2014]

THE ENERGY WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS

209

It is not uncommon for several years to pass before the
necessary approvals are acquired to begin energy development on
Indian lands—a process that takes only a few months on private
lands.84 At any time during the energy development process, a
federal agency may demand more information or shut down
development activity.85 Development projects on Indians lands are
subject to significantly more constraints than similar projects on
private lands.86 Simply completing title search requests results in
delays from the BIA. Indians have waited six years to receive title
search reports that other Americans can get in a few days.87
Despite such challenges, energy resources are the largest
revenue generator in Indian Country.88 On the Fort Berthold
reservation alone, oil and gas development generated more than
$40 million per month in revenue for the affiliated tribes in 2013.89
Throughout Indian Country, tribes and individual Indian mineral
owners earned more than $932 million in royalty revenue from oil,
gas, and minerals in 2013.90 The BIA expects Indian royalty
income to exceed $1 billion in 2014.91 Nonetheless, these returns
look paltry when compared with the potential value of energy
resources that could be developed on Indian lands.

84. Grogan, supra note 5, at 20 n.31.
85. Id. at 26.
86. These constraints include environmental and cultural resource reviews,
a $6,500 fee to the Bureau of Land Management for processing an application to
drill on Indian lands, and a mismanaged system of land ownership records. See
id.
87. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 110 (2012).
88. See Oil and Gas Outlook in Indian Country, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 1, http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed
/documents/document/idc1-024535.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GRJ3UM7L (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
89. James MacPherson, ND Tax Accord Nets $40M Monthly for Tribe,
State, PRAIRIE BUS. MAGAZINE (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.prairie
bizmag.com/event/article/id/17039/, archived at http://perma .cc/FNG6-7R2M.
90. Summary of ONRR Fiscal Year 2013 Disbursements, DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR (2013), http://www.onrr.gov/About/PDFDocs/11-13-DOI-Summary
DisbursementsData.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S79H-C2VC. This amount
represents an increase of more than $200 million over the previous year’s total.
The Office of Natural Resource Revenue attributes this increase largely to
additional oil development on the Fort Berthold reservation in North Dakota.
See Interior Department Disbursed $14.2 Billion in 2013 Energy Revenues to
Benefit Federal, State, Local and Tribal Governments, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.onrr.gov/About/PDFDocs/20131119a.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/A62F-9L8B.
91. Oil and Gas Outlook in Indian Country, supra note 88.
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IV. POTENTIAL ENERGY RESOURCES ON INDIAN LAND
Like all estimates of unrecovered energy resources, precise
measures of recoverable energy resources in Indian Country are a
matter of debate for many reasons. First, technological
advancements in resource extraction, such as recent improvement
in the hydraulic fracturing process, can render previous estimates
of unrecovered resources obsolete by increasing the amount of
resources that are technically recoverable. Second, the value of
unrecovered resources continually change as prices change,
affecting whether the costs of exploration and development exceed
the expected value of the resource. Third, estimates of mineral
resources require knowledge about the quantity and quality of
resources that can be several miles beneath the earth’s surface—
knowledge that cannot be truly known until the resources are fully
explored.92 These factors, combined with the fact that there is often
less development and exploration on reservations, make it difficult
to know what resource potential actually exists below Indian lands.
A. Estimation: How Much Energy is Available?
Such challenges, however, have not stopped the federal
government from attempting to estimate the availability of Indian
energy resources.93 A 1976 report by the General Accounting
Office found that, although exact amounts of such resources are
unknown, approximately 4.2 billion barrels of oil and about 17.5
trillion cubic feet of gas existed on 40 Indian reservations in 17
states.94 At the time, the USGS estimated that Indian oil and gas
reserves amounted to three percent of the nation’s total reserves.95
The same USGS report also estimated coal resources on Indian
land at 1,581 billion tons, or 7% to 13% of the nation’s coal
92. See GASWIRTH ET AL., supra note 74 (representing a doubling and
tripling of previous estimates of the oil and gas resources beneath the Bakken
and Three Forks formations, respectively).
93. Government efforts to estimate Indian energy resources began in the
1970s along with federal policies of self-determination such as the Indian
Mineral Development Act that allowed tribes more say in energy development
decisions. Such policies, to the extent that they increased domestic energy
production, were also consistent with national goals of energy independence in
the wake of the 1973 oil embargo. See Royster, supra note 34, at 584.
94. Report from the Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. General
Accounting Office, to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Indian Natural Resources—Part II: Coal, Oil, and Gas: Better
Management Can Improve Development and Increase Indian Income and
Employment 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1976).
95. Id. at 2.
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resources.96 The report concluded that, given such resource wealth,
“[m]ineral resources development on reservations can thus provide
substantial income and employment opportunities to the Indians.”97
The DOI has specific estimates of energy potential publicly
available for several reservations.98 Although the reports were
issued in the 1970s, and are therefore based on earlier
understandings of the minerals beneath Indian lands, they illustrate
the extent of energy wealth beneath Indian reservations. For
example, the DOI concluded in 1975 that the Crow Reservation
(13,260 enrolled tribal members) has 17 billion tons of coal and 40
million barrels of oil that remain undeveloped.99 According to a
similar report, the neighboring Northern Cheyenne Reservation
(10,500 enrolled tribal members) has even more: 23 billion tons of
undeveloped coal and 270 million barrels of undeveloped oil—
almost all of which remains undeveloped today.100
B. Valuation: How Much is the Energy on Indian Lands Really
Worth?
In 2008, the DOI estimated that Indian lands “contain over 5
billion barrels of oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53
billion tons of coal that are technically recoverable with current
technologies.”101 The DOI stated that the combined value of these

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The Department of the Interior issued a series of reports on the status of
mineral resources on Indian lands in the 1970s. See Fossil Fuel Resources,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/fossil_fuel_resources.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/86E6-T8KR (last updated July, 15, 2013).
99. W. J. MAPEL ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, STATUS OF MINERAL
RESOURCE INFORMATION FOR THE CROW INDIAN RESERVATION, MONTANA 14,
31 (1975). For tribal population, see also Crow Reservation: Demographic and
Economic Information, STATE OF MONT. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS 4 (2013), http://www.ourfactsyourfuture.org/admin/uploadedPubli
cations/2685_Crow_RF08_Web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V7VB-N2BV.
100. W. P. MAPEL ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, STATUS OF MINERAL
RESOURCE INFORMATION FOR THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION,
MONTANA 1, 35 (1975). The Northern Cheyenne tribe has largely opted not to
pursue energy development on its lands, a decision that remains a contentious
issue within the tribe. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 36. See also Northern
Cheyenne Reservation: Demographic and Economic Information STATE OF
MONTANA GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ET AL., 4 (2013), http:
//www.ourfactsyourfuture.org/admin/uploadedPublications/2694_N_Cheyenne
RF08_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CJ7L-3VYM (listing tribal
population).
101. IED Hearing, supra note 8.
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resources at that time was $875 billion.102 Using the latest census
data, which estimates that there are 5.2 million people in the
United States that self-identify as American Indian or Alaska
Native alone or in combination with one or more other races,103 the
per capita value of the energy wealth on Indian lands amounts to
approximately $170,000.104 More recently, the DOI has reiterated
similar estimates, asserting in 2012 that Indian lands have the
potential to produce 5.35 billion barrels of oil, 37.7 trillion cubic
feet of conventional natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal.105
Using a recent spot price for coal in the Powder River Basin,
the Crow Reservation’s coal reserve is worth $210 billion, and the
Northern Cheyenne’s coal reserve is worth $284 billion.106 Given a
recent spot price for West Texas Intermediate crude oil, the Crow
Reservation’s oil reserves are worth $3.8 billion, and the Northern
Cheyenne’s oil reserves are worth $25.9 billion.107 Both
reservations have yet to develop significant amounts of their coal
or oil resources.108 In 2009, the secretary of the Council of Energy
Resource Tribes, a tribal energy consortium, estimated that at
existing prices, the present-day value of energy resources on Indian
102. Id.
103. See Tina Norris et al., The American Indian and Alaska Native
Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (Jan. 2012), http://www.census.gov
/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WL7V-ZFFD.
104. It is not clear from the DOI estimate how the $875 billion figure was
derived or whether it is in present discounted value terms. If the per-capita
calculations were limited to American Indians and Alaska Natives that reside in
American Indian areas, then the per-capita value of energy resources on Indians
lands would be much higher. The U.S. Census estimates approximately 1
million American Indians and Alaska Natives reside in Indian areas, suggesting
a per-capita value of energy resources of approximately $875,000. See id. at 13–
14.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, BRIEFING FOR THE
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE
INDIAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (2012).
106. Coal News and Markets Report, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/coal/news_markets/archive/, archived at http://perma.cc
/FC32-NPSR (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (listing coal price of $12.35/ton as of
Jan. 31, 2014). These values assume that each tribe’s energy reserves remain as
they were at the time of the DOI’s original inventory. Although this assumption
may not hold in many cases, tribes such as the Northern Cheyenne have yet to
develop their coal reserves. See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9 (estimating the
Crow’s coal assets to be worth $27 billion using more recent estimates of
resource availability from the Crow tribe).
107. Petroleum & Other Liquids: Spot Prices, E NERGY I NFO . ADMIN .,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D
(last updated Sept. 17, 2014) (listing oil price of $92.82/barrel for WTI crude as
of Jan. 27, 2014).
108. Grogan, supra note 5, at 32, 36.
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lands amounted to nearly $1.5 trillion.109 This estimate implies a
potential per capita energy value of $290,000 for American
Indians.110 This amount starkly contrasts with United States
Census data estimating the per capita income of American Indians
and Alaska Natives to be $16,964.111
Although Indian lands contain tremendous energy wealth, most
tribes are not generating significant returns on their assets. In 2013,
energy resources earned tribal mineral owners $932 million in
royalty revenue.112 Using the more recent estimate of $1.5 trillion
worth of undeveloped energy resources on Indian lands, the current
annual return is less than seven ten-thousandths of a percent on
tribal energy assets.
V. ENERGY REGULATIONS AND TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
In addition to the complicated bureaucracy that oversees tribal
energy projects, other local, state, and federal regulations can make
it difficult for many tribes to capitalize on their vast energy
resources. In 2013, the Crow tribe in Montana received approval
from the BIA to lease 1.4 billion tons of coal on their reservation to
a Wyoming energy company.113 The project has the potential to
generate a source of long-term revenue for the tribe, but a host of
regulations are making the reliability of this revenue source
uncertain.114 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
announced plans in 2013 to issue strict limits on emissions from
new coal-fired power plants, and the agency is planning more
regulations for existing coal plants.115 The regulations are
109. Indian Energy and Energy Efficiency: Hearing before the S. Comm. On
Indian Affairs, 111th Cong., 12 (2009) (statement of Hon. Marcus Levings,
Chairman, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation).
110. Including only American Indians and Alaska Natives that reside in
American Indian areas, this estimate implies a per-capita value of approximately
$1.5 million. See Norris et al., supra note 103 at 13–14.
111. 2008-2012 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Table
B19301C - Per Capita Income In The Past 12 Months (In 2012 InflationAdjusted Dollars) (American Indian And Alaska Native Alone), U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages
/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_12_1YR_B19301C&prodType=table, archived
at http://perma.cc/NX3J-VWG3.
112. See Summary of ONRR Fiscal Year 2013 Disbursements, supra note 90.
113. Matthew Brown, Feds Approve 1.4B-Ton Coal Deal with Crow Tribe,
B ILLINGS G AZETTE (June 20, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://billingsgazette.com
/business/feds-approve-b-ton-coal-deal-with-crow-tribe/article_911af76d-874f5307-bd23-4db984b4050c.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G8QE-SKJL.
114. See id.
115. Lenny Bernstein & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Moves to Limit Emissions of
Future Coal- and Gas-Fired Power Plants, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2013, at A18.
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considered tough enough to make it difficult—and possibly costprohibitive—to build any new coal plants in the United States.116
A. Local Barriers
With the domestic market for coal dwindling, the tribe and its
development partners are planning to export the Crow’s coal to
international markets, a prospect that depends in part on the
construction of proposed coal export facilities in Oregon and
Washington.117 However, several cities near the proposed
terminals and along the rail routes are trying to stop coal exports,
citing concerns about traffic congestion, quality of life, and climate
change.118 Cities as far away as Missoula, Montana—more than
500 miles from the proposed terminals—have petitioned the Army
Corps of Engineers to expand the scope of its environmental
assessment of coastal terminals.119 The city council of Missoula,
Montana, for example, wants the Army Corps to conduct a
comprehensive environmental impact statement that would
evaluate consider the environmental impacts of coal-rail shipments
in Missoula and the increased carbon and mercury emissions once
the coal is burned.120
Crow tribal chairman Darrin Old Coyote opposes the cities’
attempts to stop the approval of the export terminals.121 In a letter
to the city council of Missoula, Montana, Old Coyote wrote:
Today, the Crow Tribe has a rare window of opportunity
before it, and we are doing everything in our power to take
advantage of it before that window closes . . . . For the
Crow people, there are no jobs that compare to a coal job—

116. Id.
117. Manuel Quiñones, Sagging Domestic Market has Mont. Mine, Tribe
Rolling Dice on Exports, GREENWIRE (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.eenews.net
/stories/1059987299, archived at http://perma.cc/9Q8C-BZJY.
118. Id.
119. Missoula, Mont. City Council. Resolution No. 7829 (2013), available at
http://mt-missoula2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/23402, archived at
http://perma.cc/GWJ4-2PYW.
120. Id.
121. Darrin Old Coyote, Coal Development Rare Opportunity for the Crow
Tribe, M ISSOULIAN (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://missoulian.com/news
/opinion/columnists/coal-development-rare-opportunity-for-the-crow-tribe
/article_cc331a46-3a53-11e3-b8ad-001a4bcf887a.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/6GZ6-DZVD.
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the wages and benefits exceed anything else that is
available.122
Old Coyote believes the city’s actions will delay, and could
possibly halt, the construction of the facilities necessary to
export the tribe’s coal resources.123
B. Federal Hurdles
Beyond regulations associated with the emissions or the
transportation of tribal energy resources, development projects on
tribal lands are subject to a number of federal regulations that do
not apply on private lands.124 Some of these regulations are the
result of the complex morass of agencies tasked with overseeing
Indian energy development, as discussed earlier, while others
result from the general application of federal land management
laws to Indian lands. 125 For instance, like any federal development
project, all tribal energy projects must go through National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review as well as cultural
resource review under the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA).126 Both requirements add to the complexity of energy
development on Indian lands, and neither requirement applies to
development projects on private lands.127
Stoney Anketell of the Fort Peck tribe recently noted the
frustration that such requirements can impose on tribal energy
projects.128 At a meeting in 2013 with several United States
senators, Anketell explained how the delays associated with
archaeological assessments are impairing oil and gas development
on the tribe’s reservation in eastern Montana,129 stating “[I]t takes
122. Id. Old Coyote has also remarked that “the war on coal is a war on our
families and our children.” See Terry L. Anderson & Shawn Regan, The War on
Coal Is Punishing Indian Country, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2013, at A11.
123. Old Coyote, supra note 121. See also Lynne Peeples, Coal-Hungry
World Brings Tough Choices for Native Americans, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6,
2014, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/northwest-coalexports_n_4611021.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N8H7-SBTZ (noting how
other tribes in the Pacific Northwest’s mounted vocal campaigns in opposition
to the construction of the terminals over concerns about local impacts to cultural
sites, air quality, and waterways).
124. Grogan, supra note 5, at 22.
125. Such agencies include the BIA, BLM, ONRR, and OSM. See Grogan,
supra note 5.
126. Grogan, supra note 5, at 22.
127. Id.
128. Anderson & Regan, supra note 122.
129. Id.
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too long to get leases approved, to get lease assignments approved,
to get rights of way approved.”130 Describing how such regulations
often work in practice, Anketell remarked, “We’re not
shortchanging the need for archaeological reviews, but on land that
has been farmed for seventy years? It’s been tilled, plowed,
planted, harvested. There’s no teepee rings.”131 Likewise, Ron
Crossguns of the Blackfeet tribe’s Oil and Gas Department
recently expressed frustration to a documentary filmmaker over the
effects of energy regulations on the tribe’s efforts to develop its
resources.132 “It’s our right. We say yes or no,” said Crossguns. “I
don’t think the outside world should come out here and dictate to
us what we should do with our properties.”133
Tribes are also affected by federal energy regulations in ways
that other sovereign nations are not. Tribal nations, unlike other
developing nations throughout the world, must pursue energy
development within the broader regulatory context of the United
States, which treats development projects on tribal lands much like
those on federal lands.134 Many of these regulations, including the
NEPA and NHPA review processes, are often identified by tribes
as significant obstacles to energy development.135 In addition, the
transportation of tribal energy resources to market is governed
entirely by a federal regulatory structure that can determine the
success or failure of tribal energy projects.136 Other nations in the
developing world are not subject to the broader regulations of an
unequal and more powerful sovereign in the same manner as the
relationship between Indians and the United States government.137

130. Aaron Flint, Ft. Peck Reservation: Feds Hindering Oil Development,
FLINT REPORT (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://www.northernbroadcasting
.com/Talk/FlintReportHeadlines/tabid/519/ID/9803/Ft-Peck-Reservation-FedsHindering-Oil-Development.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Q29H-K425.
131. Id.
132. Rebecca Centeno, A Conversation with Ron Crossguns, Blackfeet Oil
and Gas Department, YOUTUBE (2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=KFFxmUfI2mk, archived at http://perma.cc/DL33-YLRL.
133. Id.
134. Royster, supra note 34.
135. See Mining in America: Powder River Basin Coal Mining the Benefits
and Challenges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Energy and Res. Of the H.
Comm. on Natural Res., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Coal Mining Hearing]
(statement of Darrin Old Coyote, Chairman, Crow Nation) (“Federal regulatory
requirements for appraisals, surface access approvals and environmental
assessments to conduct exploration within the Reservation often times create
significant delays.”).
136. Old Coyote, supra note 121.
137. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1831).
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VI. SUCCESS STORIES IN TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Despite the challenges discussed above, several tribes have
succeeded in developing their energy resources for the benefit of
their tribal communities. In particular, these tribes have succeeded
by asserting their right to self-determination and by taking a more
active role in the resource development process.
The Southern Ute tribe in Colorado has arguably experienced
the most success at developing its energy resources.138 The tribe
owns and operates five energy companies and invests much of its
energy revenues into its Growth Fund, which is estimated to be
worth $4 billion.139 Today, the tribe’s 1,400 members are each
worth millions on paper and receive dividends every year from the
fund.140 The tribe’s expertise in energy development extends far
beyond the reservation’s borders. Red Willow Production
Company, a tribal-owned energy company, is engaged in oil, gas,
and coal-bed methane extraction throughout the western United
States, as well as offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico.141
The Southern Ute tribe’s success began, perhaps surprisingly,
after it declared a moratorium on issuing new energy leases in
1974.142 The tribal council recognized that the DOI failed to
negotiate appropriate compensation for leases on the reservation.143
The tribe also lacked the expertise needed to make informed
decisions about energy development projects.144 Following the
moratorium, the tribe contracted with outside experts to map and
interpret the extent of its undeveloped resources.145 In the process,
the tribe not only learned the value of their energy resources but
also just how much the federal government had undervalued
them.146 After the tribe lifted the moratorium, it continued to
consult with outside experts to guide energy development
decisions on the reservation.147 The tribe contracted with attorneys,
auditors, petroleum geologists, and others to take advantage of
138. Grogan, supra note 5, at 38.
139. Id.
140. Jonathan Thompson, The Ute Paradox, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 19,
2010 at 17 (noting that the tribe’s Growth Fund “distributes dividends to tribal
members between the ages of 26 and 59 and retirement benefits to those over
60. The numbers vary year by year and the tribe won’t reveal them, but one
Southern Ute in his 70s says his share [in 2009] totaled $77,500.”).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Grogan, supra note 5, at 38.
146. Thompson, supra note 140.
147. Grogan, supra note 5, at 38.
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changes in federal policy that allowed tribes to negotiate their own
energy leases.148 The tribe was also awarded several court
settlements for the historic federal mismanagement of tribal assets
and used the funds to create Red Willow Energy, its first energy
business.149 By operating its own energy companies, the Southern
Ute Tribe established an expertise in resource development and a
reputation for good business practices and management.150
The tribe’s approach to energy development is consistent with
tribal values of self-determination. The tribe conducts its own
audits and operates a land division that is adept at navigating the
complex layers of federal agencies that oversee energy projects.151
Revenues from energy development enable the tribe to pay for
government and social services.152 The tribal-owned energy
companies are able to take advantage of their exemption from
many of the taxes non-Indian operators must pay. The tribal
government has also made efforts to separate politics from
business, enabling tribal companies to make their own business
decisions.153
Like the Southern Ute, other tribes are asserting control over
their natural resources by purchasing and operating more aspects
of the energy development process. In 2013, the Navajo Nation
purchased the Navajo Mine, the sole provider of coal to New
Mexico’s Four Corners Generating Station, from its previous nonIndian owner, BHP Billiton.154 The mine has provided jobs to
hundreds of tribal members and generates $41 million annually for
the Navajo’s general fund.155 The tribe’s sovereign status will
afford it a lower tax burden, allowing the tribe to operate the mine

148. See id. See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012).
149. Thompson, supra note 140.
150. Grogan, supra note 5, at 38.
151. Id. See Exploration & Production Operator’s Compliance Manual for
Energy Development Projects on the Southern Ute Indian Reservation, S. UTE
INDIAN TRIBE DEP’T OF ENERGY (July 23, 2013), http://www.suitdoe.com
/Documents/EPOperatorsManual.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/393T-UYLC.
152. Thompson, supra note 140 (further noting that in addition to the Growth
Fund, the tribe manages a Permanent Fund that invests energy royalties and
casino profits in securities to provide revenue for government and social
services on the reservation).
153. Grogan, supra note 5, at 39.
154. Anne Minard, Navajo Nation Is Coal Country as Mine Sale Finalized,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 6, 2014), http://indiancountry
todaymedianetwork.com/2014/01/06/navajo-nation-coal-country-mine-salefinalized-152981, archived at http://perma.cc/T7YV-DQBX.
155. Id.
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more profitably than BHP Billiton.156 Similarly, in 2012, the Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold received initial approval from
the Secretary of the Interior to construct on their reservation in
North Dakota the first new United States refinery in more than 30
years.157 If completed, the refinery would process 13,000 barrels of
crude oil per day from the Bakken formation for the domestic
market and would ensure continued energy-related employment
and economic opportunities for the affiliated tribes.158
Beyond energy resources, tribes have demonstrated that when
they are afforded more control over natural resource management,
the result is often better management and higher output.159 In the
1990s, the Salish-Kootenai Confederated Tribes on Montana's
Flathead Reservation took over more than 100 programs previously
run by federal agencies, including forestry management.160 The
tribes now earn $2.04 for every dollar they spend on timber
management, while the neighboring Lolo National Forest, managed
by the federal government, receives only $1.11 for every dollar it
spends.161 More recently, the Salish-Kootenai tribe is looking to
purchase a dam on the reservation, thereby becoming the nation’s
first tribal hydroelectric owners and operators.162
VII. POLICY REFORMS TO PROMOTE TRIBAL CONTROL OVER
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Several policy reforms can help tribes take more control of
their energy resources, and if they choose to do so, allow tribes to
156. Id. (further stating that the Secretary of the Interior will need to approve
a lease extension for the plant and the mine to operate beyond 2016.) An
environmental review process is ongoing at the Office of Surface Mining.
157. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Approves Fort
Berthold Land Trust Application for New Refinery in North Dakota (Oct. 10,
2012), available at http://www.doi .gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-ApprovesFort-Berthold-Land-Trust-Application-for-New-Refinery-in-North-Dakota.cfm,
archived at http://perma.cc /AGE2-3S48.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Matthew B. Krepps, Can Tribes Manage Their Own
Resources? The 638 Program and American Indian Forestry, in 4 AMERICAN
INDIAN MANUAL AND HANDBOOK SERIES 179 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P.
Kalt, eds., 1993).
160. Allison Berry, Two Forests Under the Big Sky: Tribal v. Federal
Management, 45 PERC POL’Y SERIES, 1, 3 (2009). See Krepps supra note 159,
at 179 (noting that “as tribal control increases relative to BIA control, worker
productivity rises, costs decline, and income improves. Even the price received
for reservation logs increases.”).
161. Id. at 10.
162. Sarah Jane Keller, Montana Tribes Will Be the First to Own a
Hydroelectric Dam, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 25, 2013 at 7.
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harness institutional attributes that support energy-related
economic growth. Although the challenges of getting the
institutions right for tribes are multifaceted, the federal government
has clearly not lived up to its fiduciary responsibility to manage
Indian lands for the benefit of tribes and their members. Tribes
such as the Southern Ute and Salish-Kootenai have demonstrated
their ability to manage their resources, and other tribes are eager to
replicate their success. If policymakers continue to relinquish
control over Indian affairs, tribes could more easily benefit from
their energy wealth.
In line with recent efforts to afford more control to tribal
nations, Congress enacted the Helping Expedite and Advance
Responsible Tribal Homeownership (HEARTH) Act in 2012.163
The Act removes many regulatory hurdles for leasing tribal surface
lands by enabling tribes to create their own leasing regulations and
requiring the federal government to expedite its approval
process.164 In short, the Act would allow tribes with leasing plans
preapproved by the Secretary of the Interior to lease tribal land
without needing further secretarial approval for each lease.165
However, the Act does not apply to “traditional” subsurface energy
resources such as oil, natural gas, and minerals, and thus offers no
help with the obstacles and delays discussed in this Article.166
Expanding the HEARTH Act to apply to these traditional forms of
subsurface energy development, or adopting similar legislation for
such resources, would address many of these obstacles.
Like the HEARTH Act for renewable energy development,
TERA agreements are intended to promote increased tribal
sovereignty over subsurface energy development. However, as
discussed earlier, the TERA approval process is still complicated
by excessive rules and regulations.167 Streamlining the TERA
approval process to make it a more practical and effective
alternative for tribes would encourage more tribal selfdetermination and sovereignty over development decisions. In
addition, allowing individual Indian mineral owners to negotiate
IMDA or TERA agreements—and eliminating many of the steps
required to process such leases—would reduce similar obstacles
163. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012).
164. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Development
Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, but Collectively Deficient,
Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2013).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1033 n.4. Specifically, the Act is intended to promote renewable
resource development on tribal lands.
167. Grogan, supra note 5, at 16.
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faced by individual Indians residing on individual trust (allotted)
lands.168
Other policy reforms that would promote tribal sovereignty
over energy development include repealing the $6,500 fee assessed
by the BLM for processing each application to drill on Indian lands
and streamlining the approval process for energy development
throughout Indian Country.169 In response to pressure from
Congress and several tribes, the BIA created two “one-stop shops”
to expedite the complex approval process for leasing Indian lands
for energy development—one in Farmington, New Mexico for the
Navajo Reservation, and another in New Town, North Dakota for
the Fort Berthold Reservation.170 Staffed with personnel from
multiple agencies, the “shops” are intended to streamline the
bureaucracy that oversees Indian resource management.171 Thus
far, the shops appear to be providing a more reliable and consistent
permitting process for oil and gas companies seeking to contract
with tribes or individual Indians.172
Another initiative underway from within Indian Country is the
adoption of business and commercial laws that promote certainty
for lenders and other businesses.173 One example used by a
growing number of tribes is the Model Tribal Secured Transactions
Act (MTSTA). This model commercial law has enabled tribes to
harmonize their legal framework for many types of commercial
transactions with the laws of state and other tribal jurisdictions.174
This has helped to reduce some of the uncertainty and confusion
that lenders and investors often face when attempting to do
business in Indian Country. Tribes that have adopted laws such as
the MTSTA have done so to help reduce the cost of doing business
in their jurisdictions and to promote access to capital and credit for

168. These proposals are similar to legislation proposed in 2010 by Senator
Byron Dorgan of North Dakota. See Letter from the U.S. Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs to Tribal Leader (Sept. 10, 2009) (on file with author).
169. Grogan, supra note 5, at 26.
170. Id. at 24.
171. Id. at 40.
172. Id. Senator Byron Dorgan noted in 2010 that the one-stop shop on Fort
Berthold was “cutting through the red tape” and promoting a more reliable and
consistent permitting process for oil and gas companies.
173. Susan Woodrow & Fred Miller, Lending in Indian Country: The Story
Behind the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Law, 15 BUS. L. TODAY 39, 43
(2005).
174. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., GROWING ECONOMIES
IN INDIAN COUNTRY: TAKING STOCK OF PROGRESS AND PARTNERSHIPS 14
(2012).
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their tribal and member-owned businesses.175 Today, however,
many tribes still lack effective and relevant commercial laws.176
In Canada, First Nations (the equivalent of tribes in the United
States) are exploring other policy reforms that address similar
challenges to those faced by tribes in the United States. The
proposed First Nation Property Ownership Initiative would give
First Nations the opportunity to hold full legal title to their lands,
just like any other Canadian.177 Each First Nation would have the
option to choose whether to participate in the initiative.178 Those
that participate would have the power to transfer the legal title to
individuals while retaining First Nation jurisdiction over the
land.179 A similar initiative in the United States would have
dramatic implications for Native American economies, not the
least of which would be to reduce the authority of the federal
government over Indian resource development.
CONCLUSION
The discussion herein demonstrates that energy resources on
Indian lands hold the potential for generating significant wealth for
Native Americans. However, most reservations with energy
resources have not yet fully capitalized on their energy wealth. Of
course, tribal self-determination includes the right for tribes to
choose not to develop their energy wealth, as the Northern
Cheyenne tribe has done.180 But if institutional constraints such as
the federal trusteeship over Indian lands, an unstable rule of law, or
federal regulations prevent tribes from developing their natural
resources, then it is time to reconsider those institutions.
A recent report examining energy development on American
Indian lands stated, “the best way for the government to honor its
trust obligations is to stop trying to determine what is in the best
interest of tribes and instead support tribal efforts to make that
decision autonomously.”181 The report concluded, “[w]hen tribes
are free to make decisions for themselves, they have the
opportunity to align policy and planning with tribal priorities.”182
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See First Nations Property Ownership, FIRST NATIONS PROP. OWNERSHIP
INITIATIVE (2012), http://fnpo.ca/Proposal.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/4MZ3S4K4.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Grogan, supra note 5, at 36.
181. Id. at 46.
182. Id. at 47.
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Tribes have proven that when they are given the right to manage
their own resources, they repeatedly demonstrate that they can do
so in ways that benefit tribal nations and generate broader
economic growth.183 When tribes are freed from the oversight of
the federal government, they are able to determine what is best for
them and engage in economic activities that promote both their
cultures and their communities.
The importance of institutions such as property rights and the
rule of law in promoting economic growth have been demonstrated
throughout human history, and they appear to be equally important
for Native American reservations. Despite the fact that reservations
often contain valuable natural resources, many tribes remain
locked in a poverty trap. In effect, their land amounts to what de
Soto referred to as “dead capital”—unable to generate benefits to
tribes, individual Indians, or the broader economy.184 Policy
reforms that enable tribes and individual Indians to more easily
convert their land from “dead capital” into “live capital” are sorely
needed. As long as tribes are denied the right to own their land and
control their resources, they will remain locked in poverty and
dependence. If tribes are afforded the same rights and institutions
as those living outside of reservations, they would have the
opportunity to unlock the tremendous wealth of Indian nations.

183. See Berry, supra note 160.
184. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000).

